WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT THE ARABS?

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October fO, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 14489

: banks.' Such hanks are left free to voluntarily
join the Federal Reserve System if they so
desire, but they are hot compelled to com-
ply with the System’s requirements as pro-
vided in S. 1298.

Thank you for your consideration of our
request that the enclosed draft bill be In-
troduced In the Senate.

Sincerely yours,

-{■ Charles R. McNeill,

‘ •> Director, Washington Office.

CONVEYANCE OF CERTAIN LANDS
IN OKLAHOMA

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, for my-
self and. my senior colleague from Okla-
homa [Mr. Monroney], I introduce, for
appropriate reference, a bill to provide
for the conveyance of the so-called scat-
tered tracts in Oklahoma, acquired un-
der the act of June 26, 1936—49 Stat.
1967. .. .

The need for this legislation was
brought to my attention by Mr. Charlie
Elute, of Marble City, Okla., during a
recent task force trip to four counties in
eastern Oklahoma by various Federal of-
ficials, Senator Mike Monroney, Rep-
resentative Ed Edmondson, and me.

The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act,
June 26, 1936, authorized the Secretary
of Interior to acquire interest liydands
water rights, or surface rights k > lands
then owned by Indians which w/re being
used for agricultural and grazing pur-
poses. It also provided that the lands
should be held in trust by tVte United
States, and during such time, thto should
be tax free, except for a gross production
tax to be collected by the State o\Okla-
homa.

The bill I introduce today would\au-
thorize the Secretary of Interior to give
clear title of this land, including minera.
deposits, to the life tenant or his heirs.
It is left up’ to the Secretary of Interior
to determine whether or not the deed
shall provide that the land be free of
restrictions and its tax-exempt status or
subject to restrictions and its continued
tax-exempt status.

Mr. President, I am hopeful that ap-
propriate action will be taken on this
legislation at the earliest possible date.
I ask unanimous consent that the bill
be printed at this point in the Record,
together with a letter I received from
Mr. Eafl Boyd Pierce, addressed to Rep-
resentative Ep Edmondson, who is gen-
eral counsel of the Cherokee Nation, and
other letters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be received and appropriately re-
ferred; and, without objection, the bill
and letters will be printed in the Record.

The bill '(S. 2520) to provide for the
conveyance of so-called scattered tracts
in Oklahoma, acquired under the act of
June 26, 1926 (49 Stat. 1967) , introduced
by Mr. Harris (for himseif and Mr.
•Monroney")’, was received, read twice by
Its title^ referred to the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, and ordered
to be printed in the Record, as follows:

'"*■ S. 2520

Be it enacted ‘by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
.ytr^epea iri 'Congress assembled. That the
wecretnry of the Interior Is authorized and
"^recitgd to ‘convey to the life tenant, his
heirs, devisees, successors, or assigns, title to

the entire Interest In lands and Improve-
ments thereon, including mineral deposits,
that were acquired by the United States in
trust for a designated Individual Indian for
his lifetime and thereafter in trust for the
Tribe, pursuant to the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act of June 26, 1936 (49 Stat. 1967) :
Provided, That the Secretary shall determine
'in each Instance, that It Is In the best Inter-
est of the Intended grantee to convey, and
the deed shall so provide, such land either
■(a) free of restrictions and Its tax-exempt
status, or (b) subject to restrictions against
alienation and Its continued tax-exempt
status as provided under such Act of June
26, 1936.

The letters presented by Mr. Harris
are as follows;

Muskogee, Okla., April 3, 1967.
Hon. Ed Edmondson,

Member of Congress,

Washington, D.C.

Dear Ed: Immediately following the clos-
ing of the Task Force Meeting in Tahlequah,
Mr. Virgil Harrington suggested that I make
an effort to solve the Charlie Flute land
problem.

Mr. Flute a nd his Moth er Mrs. M ollie
Flute, canja-^rme omce early this
andjw«3fmaps, relevant Bureau letters and
r documents completely clarified the
title picture. Later Mrs. Merzl Schroeder, an
extremely able attorney with the Bureau and
Tahlequah Superintendent, Johnny Walker,
■arrived with the “Flute File” giving more
exact Information concerning the history of
the title in question. Attached hereto Is a
photostat copy of the Bureau letter dated
March 14, 1956, addressed to Mr. Flute spell-
ing out the essential facts, except that the
land description constituted the original
allotment of Charlie’s Grandmother, Esther
Flute, Full' Blood Cherokee, Roll Number
26718, now deceased. The Government paid
the taxes on the land described In the Bu-
reau letter on January 14, 1942, and by
separate Deeds, in each case from the Grand-
mother Esther, approved title was conveyed
as shown In said letter to the individuals, all
whom were Full. Blood Cherokees, fee title
tiding placed in the United States In Trust
for each Individual, during life time, then In
Trust fw the Tribe, “until such time as the
use of thKjand Is assigned by the Secretary”
to either “asqpoperatlve group” or to an In-
dividual Indialyand then “In Trust for such
. group or IndlvlclblU”. Some of this language
employed In the gristing clause was author-
ized by the Act of Jtqie 26, 1936 (49 Stat.'
1967).

In any event It is plalfslhat under the
granting clause of the Grandmother, the Sec-
retary was given authority at the instant of
Mr. Flute’s death to bypass thb. < Cherokee
Tribe, as a remainderman, and plane the
beneficial use of the property dlrec^v and
Immediately In either a cooperative group or
in an individual Indian, at the discretion of
the Secretary.

Thus, Mrs. Schroeder and I have agreed
that Congress alone has the authority
dispose of lands where the title is held In
the United States, and it Is believed tl)fet
the attached proposed Bill, if enacted
enable Mr. Flute and all other Chejdkees
slmllarlly situated to receive, If tJjsrSecre
tary so determines, a restrlctedjpe'fitle along
with exemption from advjjlefcm taxes. Mr.
Flute’s case, and l^jw^Eatlsfled that there
sure a few othRm -Hfriie same situation, would
cectalnly^Justlfy the consideration afforded
to him by this proposed Bill. At least the
discretion is left with the Secretary as to
both items, and we are assured that with
the passage of the Bill Mr. Flute will have
no trouble obtaining adequate credit from
either the Bureau or the Tribe, sufficient to
satisfy his housing and other reasonable
needs. Both Mrs. Schroeder and Mr. Walker
share these views.

We understand that there is a particular
urgency about this matter and that it was
Mr. Harrington’s wish that the Bill be sent
Immediately to you with copies to our Sen-
ators, provided Mrs. Schroeder was satisfied
with the proposal.

It is understood, of course, that the De-
partments will be called upon for reports
and If by chance any important legal points
have been overlooked the same will be cor-
rected by the experts In the Departments.
We understood that the Task Force would
he intolerant of any unusual delay in bring-
ing to Mr. Charlie Flute positive and effec-
tive relief. My personal expression of gratifi-
cation for the timely appearance and good
work of the Task Force will come later.

Sincerely yours,

Earl Boyd Pierce.

General Counsel,

Cherokee Nation.

U.S. Department of the Interior,

Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Muskogee, Okla., March 14, 1956.
Mr. Charlie Flute,

Rt. 1, Bunch, Okla.

Dear Charlie: On our last Field Day In
Salllsaw, you requested that we send you
[ascri ptions and plats of land deeded to
tneT9*4ted States in Trust for Charlie, John-
nie Macky Nancy, Bettle, Sarah, Thomas and
Homer Flute. The land Is described below:

Acres

Charlie Flute: Lot 2 and SW NE Of sec.

1-13-23 80

Johnnie Mack: Lots 3 and 4 and SE NW

sec. 1-13-23 120

Nancy Flute now Christie: Lot 1 and SE

NE and N2 NE SE 1-13N-23 100

Homer Flute: NW NE of sec. 12-13N-

23 - - 40

Homer Flute: W2 NW of sec. 11-13N-

23 80

Bettle Flute: S2 NE and EU'SE sec. 10-

13N-23 .' 160

Sarah Flute: NW of sec. 10-13N-23 160

Thomas Flute: N2 SW and NE SE SW

and NW SW SE, sec. 12-13-23 100

Thomas Flute : NE NE SE and NW NE SE
see. 11-13N-23E 1 20

Total acres 860

You also requested a description of the
land of John Flute, Jr., Cherokee #25719.
His land is described as: E2 SW and W2 SE
of sec. 11-13N-23E, 160 acres.

You asked whether or not the land, that
had been deeded in Trust to you children
oould be sold? In a lot of cases where land
Is deeded to the United States in Trust for
people can be sold by Issuing a (Patent in
Fee.) Your Deeds do not come under this.
They state: To the United States In Trust
for “You Flutes” named above, during hls
lifetime, then In Trust for the Cherokee Tribe
of Oklahoma." This means, that all you have
Is a Life estate In the land, described opposite
your names, then the land reverts to the
Cherokee Tribe at your death.

We are enclosing 4 small plats of the above
described land and 1 large plat showing all
the land.

If there Is anything further that we can
do for you, please advise us.

Sincerely yours,

H. Nicholson,

Field Representative.

HN:hm

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING-
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, on behalf
of myself and Senators Brewster, Hart,
Hatfield, Javits, McGee, McGovern,
Mondale, Morse, Young of Ohio, and
Percy, I submit a concurrent resolution
dealing with the subject of United Na-

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE October 10, 1967

tions peacekeeping and peacemaking, and
ask that it be appropriately referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The con-
current resolution will be received and
appropriately referred; and, under the
rule, the concurrent resolution will be
printed in the Record.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res.
47) was referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations, as follows:

S. Con. Res. 47

Whereas Congress has urged that there
should be developed permanent organization
and procedures to enable the United Nations
promptly to employ suitable United Nations
forces for such purposes as observation and
patrol in situations that may threaten in-
ternational peace and security (H. Con. Res.
373, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second session) ;
and

Whereas the need for such forces has been
demonstrated by past experience and will be
even greater in the future; and

Whereas United Nations impartial peace-
keeping forces will continue to be a major
instrument for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security : Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate ( the House of Rep-
resentatives concurring) , That the Congress
reaffirms its support for United Nations
peacekeeping and peacemaking and urges:

(a) That, as an immediate objective, the
United States Government —

(1) encourage and support the earmarking
and specialized training of units by United
Nations member states for employment in
United Nations peacekeeping operations;

(2) be prepared to make available to the
United Nations transport, communications

'and logistical personnel and facilities; and,

(3) be prepared to advocate or support on
all appropriate occasions proposals for guide-
lines to govern the financing, training, equip-
ping, and duration of peacekeeping forces for
effective use, as well as guidelines to govern
concomitant machinery for peacemaking
where peacekeeping forces are in use.

(b) That, as part of the long-range de-
velopment of the United Nations as a more
effective instrument for building and keep-
ing peace, the United States Government en-
courage and support the creation of a per-
manent, individually recruited force under
United Nations command for impartial peace-
keeping duties.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the recent
crisis in the Middle East focused atten-
tion once again on the role of U.N. forces
in preventing international conflict. De-
bate on the rationale of the withdrawal
of U.N.E.F. troops continues. But under-
lying all debate is the recognition that
first, a U.R. force is a vital component in
the effort to develop effective machinery
for peaceful settlement of disputes; and
second, that there is a critical need to de-
velop sound rules for the effective use
of U.N. forces.

Much has been said about the unwis-
dom of the United States assuming the
role of"‘policeman of the world.” I agree
that the United States cannot and
should not assume such a role. But what
are the alternatives? Some say the
United States should intervene unilat-
erally wherever the peace is threatened;
some say that a return to isolationism is
the only answer. But neither extreme is
appropriate in today’s world of rapid
transportation and instant communica-
tion, where the possibility of worldwide
nuclear holocaust looms large whenever
there is a disruption of the peace at any
point on the globe.

By taking initiatives within the United
Nations, I believe the tJnited States can
fulfill its responsibilities to the mainte-
nance of world peace in a way properly
fitting our role as the world’s most power-
ful nation by providing specific recom-
mendations for the creation of a perma-
nent U.N. peace force with rules to guide
its effective use and financing.

Under the present system, as we have
seen, U.N. forces are pulled together on
an ad hoc basis in the heat of conflict
with confused regulations as to their use,
and their existence may be abruptly ter-
minated just when they are most needed.
Indeed, it is a wonder that they have
been as successful as they have been.
Certainly, the time has come to take a
hard look at what can be done to assure
the development of an effective arm of
enforcement for the principles contained
in article I of the United Nations Char-
ter.

As a minimal step in this direction, I
have submitted the Senate concurrent
resolution which I have just sent to the
desk. Its companion measure. House
Concurrent Resolution 130 and 131, has
already been introduced in the other
body by 63 Representatives.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that, at the next printing
of the bill (S. 2321) to supplement the
antitrust laws of the United States in or-
der to prevent anticompetitive practices,
by providing for just compensation upon
termination of certain franchise rela-
tionships, the name of the Senator from
Wisconsin [Mr. Nelson] be added as a
cosponsor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, on behalf of the Senator from New
York [Mr. Kennedy], I ask unanimous
consent that, at its next printing, the
names of the Senator from Idaho [Mr.
Church] and the Senator from Oregon
[Mr. Hatfield] be added to the bill (S.
2394) to amend the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act with re-
spect to the labeling of packages of
cigarettes, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent on behalf of the Senator from New
York [Mr. Kennedy], I ask unanimous
consent that, at its next printing, the
name of the Senator from Oregon [Mr.
Hatfield] be added as a cosponsor of the
bill (S. 2395) to direct the Federal Com-
munications Commission to establish
regulations prohibiting certain broad-
casting of advertising of cigarettes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, on behalf of the Senator from New
York [Mr. Kennedy], I ask unanimous
consent that the name of the Senator
from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] be added
as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 2396) to
amend the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 to tax cigarettes on the basis of
their tar and nicotine content.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL CONFEREES ON H.R,
11456

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as chair-
man of the Subcommittee on the Depart-
ment of Transportation, of the Commit-
tee on Appropriations, I ask unanimous
consent that the following named Sena-
tors be added as conferees on the part of
the Senate to the conference to be held
on the bill (H.R. 11456) making appro-
priations for the Department of Trans-
portation for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1968, and for other purposes: The
Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pas-
tore] the Senator from Oklahoma
[Mr. Monroney], and the Senator from
Maine [Mrs. Smith].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI-
CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE AP-
PENDIX

On request, and by unanimous con-
sent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc.,
were ordered to be printed in the Ap-
pendix, as follows :

By Mr. FULBRIGHT:

Article entitled “Military-Industrial Com-
plex,” written by Joseph C. Harsch, and pub-
lished in the Christian Science Monitor of
October 4, 1967.

Article entitled “A General in Arms,” an
interview of Gen. James M. Gavin by Emmet
John Hughes, published in Newsweek maga-
zine for October 16, 1967.

WH

V THE A1

iCE DO ABOUT
THE ARABS?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it
was with interest that I read an article
in the September 1 issue of Fortune
magazine, by an old friend and a very
excellent reporter, Mr. Dan Cordtz. The
article is entitled “But What Do We Do
About the Arabs?”

I believe it would be worthwhile for
the Senate to give the article due con-
sideration, because of the difficulties
which exist, which have existed, and
which may well exist in the Middle East
for some time to come, so that collec-
tively as well as individually we may
achieve a better understanding of the
problem.

I ask unanimous consent that this per-
tinent piece of information be printed
at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the Record,
as follows:

But What Do We Do About the Arabs?

(By Dan Cordtz)

(Note. — The strategic importance of the
Middle East to the world’s industrial nations
often gets overlooked in close-in debate over
the Israeli-Arab war. In the first three
articles of this issue Fortune assesses the
high stakes involved in terms of people,
geography, and — by no means least — oil.)

Two decades ago, In the eyes of nearly all
Arabs, the U.S. towered over every other
major power. Today America is a curse on the
lips of many of the moBt Intelligent and
moderate in their ranks. "At this moment,”

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October 10, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 14491

claims an embittered Princeton-educated
former Jordanian minister, “there is no Arab
more extreme than the other. What I say
about the U.S. is being said by every Kuwaiti,
Saudi, or Libyan. Lite Churchill, we are
ready to make an alliance with the devil to
keep ourselves alive.” An American historian
declares flatly that “not since the Boxer Re-
bellion has there been as rapid and ubiqui-
tous a revulsion against a foreign power as
there has been against the U.S. in the Middle
East.” And a man who once helped formu-
late our Arab policy sadly acknowledges that
“our ability to play a role in that region has
never been less than it is today.”

This gloomy assessment is shared by many
well-informed people in the U.S. — in gov-
ernment and outside. Some knowledgable
specialists in the State Department are very
concerned about the precipitous decline in
our Influence. So are the most respected
academic experts on the Middle East and,
when they are willing to discuss it, American
businessmen with interests and long experi-
ence in the Arab lands. Their fears, together
with the outrage and despair of Arabs who
were once among America’s closest friends,
suggest the time has come for a realistic,
full-scale reappraisal of our objectives in the
Arab world, their priorities, and the means
by which they can best be attained.

The stakes are great, and go far beyond
our obvious interest in the safety of Israel.
In a world of intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, the Middle East has lost some of its
historic value as a strategic geographic area.
Some, but npt all. For the region is still the
fastest, cheapest transportation route — by
air or sea — between Western Europe and
Asia. And still more important, beneath its
desert sands, lie close to 300 billion barrels
of petroleum, about three-fourths of the
non-Communist world’s proved reserves.

. Daily production of the Arab wells total more
than nine million barrels.. According to oil
consultant Walter Levy, the complete loss
of this oil could not be made up by any com-
bination of other sources within a decade —
if at all. Western Europe imports 5,600,000
barrels of Arab oil each day, 65 percent of its
requirements, and Japan 1,200,000 (60 per-
cent) . If the Russians should achieve dom-
ination of the Arab countries, as many
Arabs now fear they will, they could black-
mail both Western Europe and Japan by
threatening to turn off the taps and cripple
their economies. The ultimate price for as-
sured oil supplies, some American diplomats
grimly speculate, could well be a sharp
diminution of U.S. influence in Europe and
Asia.

The major goal of most of our efforts iri the
Middle East is to keep that from happening.
There are serious doubts,, today that we are
succeeding. The Communist camel poked his
nose under the tent In 1355 when Egyptian
President Nasser, rebuffed by the U.S.,
turned to Czechoslovakia for weapons. In
the years since, the beast has steadily made
nejv encroachments. None of the Arab coun-
tries can yet be labeled Red satellites, but
the Russian gains have been impressive and
worrisome. In Syria, where a series of coups
d’etat has wiped out layer on' layer of edu-
cated leaders and many of those who remain
are leftist, the army is Russian equipped and
largely directed by Soviet advisers. Egypt, its
economy almost bankrupt and its expensive
military machine shattered, is more depend-
ent than ever on Russian assistance. Two
years after the elimination of Premier Ben
Bella, Algeria still truculently proclaims its
close friendship with Russia. And these are
three of the weightiest Arab nations.

Underlying elements' of strength remain
to us: only recently escaped from colonial
rule, the Arabs are not anxious to hand over
their independence: even Nasser has kept
local Comniunlsts under control and has
moved quietly to restore communication
with the U.S. And "Communism, as an Ideol-

ogy, is incompatible with the Arabs' dom-
inant Islamic faith. That said, though, re-
emergence of the dormant Arab-Israeli con-
flict has so polarized Middle Eastern politics
that there is danger that nearly all the Arab
countries will ally themselves with the Soviet
Union in opposition to iBrael and its pro-
tector, the U.S. Anti-Communist Arabs fran-
tically warn that this is already happening.
According to a Lebanese statesman whose
pro-Western credentials are beyond re-
proach, "The U.S. must ask itself this cen-
tral question : ‘Are we ready to hand over the
Middle East to the Russians?’ ”

Measured against the U.S. Government’s
own formally enunciated goals, our present
approach can hardly be termed a rousing
success. We have failed to keep the Russians
out or under control. We were unable to pre-
vent an outbreak of hostilities. The Suez
Canal is closed once more. Continued access
to the oil, on acceptable terms, remains in
doubt. It can even be argued that Israel’s
long-term security and prosperity, far from
being enhanced, are today in greater
Jeopardy.

Some of these aims, it must be conceded,
are so ambitious as to be almost unrealistic;
perhaps no policy devised by human in-
genuity can ever attain them all. Washing-
ton officials warn that “the first thing to re-
member is that we aren’t God.” One ob-
serves: “We found out in this latest Middle
Eastern crisis that even we and the Soviets
together couldn’t give orders and expect peo-
ple to snap their heels and come to atten-
tion.” There is much to this. The Arab world
is not a “world” but a sprawling, diffuse col-
lection of thirteen states with little in com-
mon but language. Our goals there are some-
times contradictory, as we seek to remain
friendly with states antagonistic to one an-
other. Our tools are limited: our military
strength is unusable, our aid programs are
hedged with restrictions demanded by Con-
gress, and persuasion is often ineffective. In
a sense, moreover, our efforts are subject to
a double veto: Israel and its supporters can
establish one boundary to our policy, and
the oil-producing Arab states another.

THE LOUD, PERSUASIVE VOICE

The U.S. is actually confronted with two
different though related sets of problems.
The first, ever present in the background and
at times totally overshadowing the other, -
arises out of our very special friendship with
Israel. Virtually all the Arab countries’
leaders came to power after Israel’s establish-
ment, and therefore began relations with the
U.S. tacitly accepting our close ties with the
Jewish state we had helped create. While the
Middle East is quiet those ties can usually be
ignored in the interests of cooperation. But
when periodically the two sides clash, as
they did over passage through the Gulf of
Aqaba, U.S. support of Israel produces a
poisonous Arab reaction. i

The second group of complications have
their origin in the frequently waspish rela-
tions among the Arab nations themselves.
For a number of years this has really meant
relations of each of^the other nations with
Nasser. Other regimes must come to grips
with the Egyptian leader because he is,
however much they may deplore it, the most
popular political leader in the Arab world
and the only Arab to whom both the big
powers pay much attention. And he has
evinced ambitions about his and Egypt’s
role in the Arab world that almost inevitably
pose threats to leaders of the oil-producing
lands, where are greatest material interests
lie.

Nasser appears to be aiming for eventual
unification of the Arab world under his
domination. Part of his motivation is prob-
ably personal ambition. But he also seems
to persuade millions that the welfare of
Egypt and even the other Arabs will thereby
be served. Wealth and population are un-

evenly distributed in the Middle East; KU
wait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya have lots of
oil and few people, while Egypt is poor and
crowded. Thus a combination, Nasser be-
lieves, would benefit everyone. And the re-
gion’s political power, he reasons, would be
enhanced if it spoke on the world stage with
one voice. In his efforts, though, Nasser
has run afoul of the nationalist aspirations of
other Arab rulers, who are unwilling to sub-
mit to his leadership. While his appeal to the
masses is great and extends to literally all of
the Arab lands, he is regarded as a threat
by many of their leaders — especially King
Hussein of Jordan, King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, and Presi-
dent Bourguiba of Tunisia.

In his drive to unify and lead the Arabs,
Nasser has tried a number of different tactics.
He Joined with Syria and, later in 1958, Ye-
men, to form the United Arab Republic, then
sadly watched its dissolution three years
later after a Syrian Army revolt. He has been
accused by other Arab chieftains of plotting
to overthrow or assassinate them. He has
employed Radio Cairo to pour out a steady
stream of vilification on those who opposed
him. He intervened in Yemen’s civil war to
gain a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and
to ensure a friendly regime in Aden when
the British depart. More recently, of course,
he used the tension of the confrontation
with Israel to force Hussein into a military
pact. None of these stratagems has really
been successful. From time to time, disap-
pointed and chastened, Nasser retires behind
his own borders vowing to concentrate on
Egypt’s internal economic problems. But an
American acquaintance suggests that those
problems are so staggering that Nasser can
bear to look at them for only six months
or so and then begins longing again for his
old foreign adventures.

The official U.S. attlutde toward Nasser has
swung wildly from ardent cultivation to
near-ostracism. A former government ofllclal
who knows the Egyptian president well con-
tends that we have always handled him ex-
actly wrong — wooing him when we should
have been firm and hitting him too hard
when the wooing didn’t work. Thus in the
early days of the Kennedy Administration, he
suggests, we were overgenerous in granting
aid to Egypt, then too precipitate in with-
drawing it four years later when Nasser dis-
pleased us. Egyptian resentment was height-
ened by the fact that in the year before
withdrawal 98 percent of the aid was food,
which made it appear that we were condemn-
ing Egypt’s poor > starvation out of spite.

There are those who believe, however, that
we had lost any hope of getting along with
Nasser long before that. They label the Is-
raeli raid on the Gaza Strip in February, 1955,
the beginning of the end. Nasser was ap-
palled to discover, when the Israeli troops
poured into Gaza, that they could Just as
easily have swept on to Cairo. He demanded
that the U.S. sell him arms to counterbal-
ance the Israeli strength. After months of
unsuccessful haggling, he announced a deal
with the Czechs for weapons in amounts and
varieties far greater than anything he had
asked from the U.S. In July, 1956, President
Eisenhower, Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles, retaliated by backing down on com-
mitments to help build the high dam at
Aswan. A week later Nasser seized the Suez
Canal, and three months after that Israel,
Britain, and France invaded Egypt. Ulti-
mately, of course, the U.S. played a major
role in forcing the invaders out. But Dulles’
legalistic rationalizations fanned little
warmth in Egyptian breasts; some Egyptians
blame us for bringing about the crisis in the
first place.

In our dealings with other Arab countries,
we have always been Influenced by the
thought of Nasser in the background. Thus
we have quickly cooled to Arabs who seemed
to share Nasser’s radical aims: Syria, the

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Yemeni Republicans, sometimes Iraq. And we
have been solicitous of those who appeared
potential counterweights to Nasser. The most
striking example, of course, is Jordan, where
we have poured millions into an effort to
create a viable economy in a state almost
without resources. The weakness in this bal-
ancing policy has always been the Israeli
question. When the Middle East is evenly di-
vided between the revolutionaries and the
conservatives, our material interests are rea-
sonably protected. But where Israel is con-
cerned, no Arab leader is secure enough to
stand by us while we maintain a posture of
favoritism. It seems fair to ask if we might
improve our prospects in the Arab world, and
indirectly further Israel’s best long-term in-
terests, by a more visibly evenhanded ap-
proach.

A COMMITMENT ABANDONED '

Evenhandedness, of course. Is not always
easy to attain. At times it is impossible.
When Nasser announced the blockade of the
Gulf of Aqaba, there was no middle ground.
The U.S. had to accept it or oppose it; we
opposed it. Similarly, when an intransigent
Arab leader puts us in a position that chal-
lenges our commitment to Israel’s existence,
we have no room for maneuver. But there
have been many examples of less inevitable
partiality in the past that had already condi-
tioned the Arabs to regard us as completely
in the Israeli camp when trouble came. Offi-
cial government aid to Israel ($1.1 billion),
for example, almost equals that given Egypt
over the, past two decades — although Egypt
has eleven times as many people. In that
same period another $1 billion in private aid,
by means of tax-deductible contributions
to the United Jewish Appeal, has tipped the
balance even more. And while the U.S. Gov r
emment seldom hesitates to threaten the
cutoff of aid when Arab regimes displease us,
only at the time of the Suez Invasion of 1956
did we use that stick on Israel. Much as we
deplored the Israeli attack in June, we did
not employ all the pressure available to us to
head it off. (liter the cease-fire, moreover, the
U.S. posture in the United Nations was
plainly on. .the side of Israel. However compel-
ling our reasons, we abandoned an uncon-
ditional seventeen-year-old commitment —
reaffirmed as recently as May 23 by President
JTohnson — to the territorial, integrity of all
the states in the Middle East. We also ab-
stained on the Pakistani resolution deploring
Israel’s take-over of Jerusalem, although we
had publicly criticized such action. Not sur-
prisingly, even the more moderate Arabs
were outraged.

Some studies of what can be done to re-
store our badly damaged position are under
way in the government, but there is reason
to doubt that they are as searching and crit-
ical as the situation may require. Early in
the crisis. President Johnson appointed a
special task force run by former White House
aide McGeorge Bundy, giving the impression
that Washington was taking a hard new
look at our policies. But Bundy has now
gone back to his duties at the Ford Founda-
tion and is spending only part time on the
Washington project. Officials are at pains,
moreover, to deny that any criticism of the
past was implied by the task force’s appoint-
ment. It was designed merely to help coordi-
nate operations related to Middle Eastern
problems, they expain.

“OPINION IS A VERY FLEXIBLE THING”

The fact is that Washington policy makers,
while they insist they are not complacent,
seem remarkably unalaxmed. Consoled by
what they call disastrous Soviet losses, they
discount the view of moderate Arabs that
our own losses have been even more severe.
They appear to regard Arab emotions as not
truly a factor in the equation, or at least
as too unreliable to consider in planning
future action. Some speak confidently, and
even condescendingly, of how fickle those

emotions are. (“Opinion is a very flexible
thing in the Arab world," a responsible
official remarks. “An Egyptian journalist once
told me that it takes three days to change
public opinion in Egypt.") They count
heavily on the traditional divisions of the
Arab world and fear of Communism to send
some of its leaders scurrying back to us for
aid and protection.

They also recognize the formidable built-in
political resistance to any consideration of
new directions in American Middle Eastern
policies. The overwhelming majority of U.S.
citizens neither know nor care anything
about the "region. Most of those who do care
are emotionally partial to Israel, and many
of these are effectively vocal in their support.
Few of the remainder can or will make them-
selves heard. Either they are dissuaded by
fears of being labeled anti-Semitic, or their
small voices are lost in the void of public
indifference.

This near-unanimous backing for Israel
handicaps U.S. diplomats in .the Arab world.
In the recent fighting, certainly, Israel bene-
fited from the fact that the Syrians and
Egyptians had provoked the crisis and had
made noisy threats about their intentions.
But the American public’s sympathy for
Israel has been obvious throughout the little
country's history. “There’s nothing we can
do about that partiality,” says a former U.S.
ambassador to a major Arab capital. “It’s
the great embarrassment of the official policy
in the Middle East.”

The one-sided attitude of the American
public, moreover, reflects more than their
sympathetic feelings about the Israelis.
Americans react negatively to their image of
the Arabs as backward, cruel, largely un-
civilized desert dwellers— an image, accord-
ing to one Arab scholar, derived from dimly
recalled, badly taught Sunday-school stories
and unconscious religious hostility toward
Islam. There is no real knowledge to counter
the myths. Certainly there is little awareness
of the Arabs’ illustrious history, a fact that
infuriates them. And far too often the Arabs,
as some of them admit, have been their own
worst enemies. Many of their leaders have
offended U.S. voters and their representatives.
Extravagant language is much admired in the
Arab world, for example, but Americans tend
to take it at face value.

On the other hand, we have made no effort
- whatever to look at the problems of the Mid-
dle East through Arab eyes. To do so is to
begin to discern the dimensions of their
grievances. There are many — not ail of them
entirely realistic. Many Arabs believe we
want the militarily weak and divided, which
may well be true so long as Nasser remains
the obvious candidate to lead a united Arab
world. They suspect we want to retain,
through our aid programs and other means,
much of the influence of the old colonial
powers. They charge that we have brought
them into the cold war by forcing Egypt to
turn to the Communists for weapons and by
labeling neutrality immoral. They complain
that our assistance to them is niggardly and
motivated not by friendship but by self-
interest. These grievances have long existed,
but they have been given special force by
dramatization of the more serious Arab
charge that we are blatantly partial where
Israel is concerned. So strongly do they feel
about this that many who reject Nasser’s
charges of direct U.S. involvement in the
war regard our financial and diplomatic sup-
port of Israel as almost equally reprehensible.

THE IRREPLACEABLE OIL

Only the complaint about Israel is univer-
sal. But it has inflamed even basically pro-
Westerri’ Arabs so much that many are now
Inclined to endorse the other accusations
as well. And the compulsion to strike back
Jeopardizes, to a greater degree than ever
before, our stake in the Arab countries’ oil.
There is considerable reluctance, on the part
of American oilmen no less than government

officials, to make much of this stake in public.
They realize that it is all but impossible,

In a nation with the popular traditions of the
U.S. to suggest that material interests should
be weighed along with such human consid-
erations as Israel’s welfare. It is senseless,
however, not to face up to the very real
possibility of the loss of the oil and the im-
plications of such a loss.

In ten years, development of alternative
sources of energy could reduce Arab oil’s im-
portance drastically. But for now it is quite I
literally irreplaceable. Even the present par-
tial boycott has created serious hardships for
Britain. The added transportation costs and
higher prices for substitute oil amount to
roughly $1 million a day. The U.S., whose Arab
petroleum imports amounted to only 350,000
barrels a day, hag not suffered, but individual
American companies have been hurt (see
page 86). As a group, U.S. oil firms have a
gross Investment of nearly $3 billion ($1.5
billion net after depreciation) in the Arab
lands, and their profits from production there
last year amounted to more than $1 billion.

It is by no means clear what the oil com-
panies’ fate will be. The largest Arab oil-
producing states, thus far, have not shown
great enthusiasm for the total shutdown ad-
vocated by some Arab countries. The meas-
ures they have taken, in fact, were the least
they could do as members of the Arab
world. But oilmen still have their fingers
crossed. An unhappy executive In Beirut
says, “It would be difficult for me to lay a
bet on our being here five years from now,
and if we are the situation won’t be easy.”

Yet immediate nationalization of the fields
and expulsion of the foreign operating com-
panies is unlikely. The idea has long ap-
pealed to many Arab leaders, including some
whom the U.S. Government regards as
friends. Even splitting the proceeds about
sixty-forty with the companies, and selling
at the lowest prices In the world ($1.59 per
barrel for Kuwaiti oil compared with $2.27
for Venezuelan crude), the oil-producing
countries take in an estimated $2.5 billion a
year in royalties and taxes from the oil firms.

If they could keep all the selling price, and
could agree among themselves to raise that
price, the wealth generated — for economic
development or weapons — would be stagger-
ing. Nationalization, however, would be far
from easy to carry out. Arab experts agree
that all the countries would' have to take
the step together and this just doesn't seem
to be in the cards under the present cir-
cumstances.

Even if the countries could coordinate na-
tionalization, they would face the formid-
able problem of selling their oil. The market-
ing outlets in the major oil-consuming re-
gions are in private hands. Unless the evicted
companies agreed to buy the oil, foregoing
their share of the most profitable phase of
the business, the Arabs would have almost
no place to turn. “It would be very difficult
to replace the financial resources of the
Western world," admits an Arab petroleum
expert.

If nationalization is only a remote threat,
however, some form of painful squeeze on
the companies is probable. A continuation
of the crisis, in fact, seems likely to bring
unwelcome changes in the structure of the
industry. The French are vigorously seeking
to convert President de Gaulle’s stance into
material advantage by improving their po-
sition In the Arab oil fields. And the Italian
Government oil agency, E.N.I., which has
long coveted access to Arab oil, now seems
within sight of its goal. Talks between E.N.I.
and the Iraqi Government have been going
on since 1961, when Iraq announced the ex-
propriation of about 99 percent of the West-
ern consortium’s acreage. Now the Italian
Government reportedly is dangling a $70-
million low-interest loan in exchange for a
development contract for E.N.I. American
oilmen are resigned to seeing both the

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French and the Italians achieve some meas-
ure of success.

It appears certain that the companies will
have to settle for a' smaller share of the oil
revenues. Three weeks after the cease-fire,
Beirut’s authoritative Middle East Economic
Survey noted that “Arab oil producing coun-
tries, to fulfill their role as financiers of the
Arab world, will have to insure a steady in-
crease in their oil revenues, not only in terms
of over-all payments but also in terms of per-
barrel payments.” Even if the situation quiets
down, therefore, the outlook is for slimmer
profits and more painful headaches in 'the
oil business. And if large-scale fighting
Should break out once more, with the U.S.
sympathetic to the Israelis, expulsion of
American firms would be a real possibility, no
matter how seif-destructive that might be.

WHAT’S GOOD FOR ISRAEL?

In spite of its Importance, if our interest in
the oil conflicted directly with our concern
for Israel, we would probably regretfully have
to watch the oil go down the drain. But our
stake in both may well call for some shift in
our position. A good case can be made that
Israel, for reasons easy to understand, has
been pursuing a course that is not in its own
best long-term interests. It could further be
argued that the U.S. has encouraged these
unwise policies by failure to view the Middle
East from a more dispassionate and balanced
position. Thus the U.S. alienated the Arabs
and was unable to dissuade Israel from action
that may have made its existence all the
more precarious. The shock waves from
Israel’s victory are still sweeping across the
Middle East. Ironically, U.S. officials say, they
threaten most damage in the very lands that
had been most tolerant toward Israel. The
tiny Jewish state’s long-range security, more-
over, may not truly be enhanced by boundary
changes or declarations of an end to belliger-
ency or even free passage through the Gulf
of Aqaba. Ultimately, Israel can prosper only
If its Arab neighbors can be reconciled to its
presence.

In the long sweep of history the Arabs have
a lot going for them. The Western world
tends to view Israel even now as the under-
dog — a tiny Jewish David facing the Arab
Goliath. This is true in terms of total popu-
lations (2,500,000 Israelis versus 110 million
Arabs) and geographic area, but today the
Israelis are almost a match for the Arabs in
terms of citizens able to play a constructive
role in modern society— -those in good health,
educated, skilled, and possessed of high
morale. The Arabs are not likely to remain
forever industrially backward, unable to em-
ploy the tools of destruction effectively. In
spite of many mistakes and setbacks, a re-
markable amount of progress has already
been made in education in the past decade.
By 1990, moreover, the Arabs are expected to
number more than 200 million to Israel’s six
million, at present rates of growth. If the ten-
sions cannot be eased somehow, Israel one
day will face overwhelming force. Even pro-
tected by nuclear weapons or foreign allies,
it will then only be able to emulate Samson
and destroy its enemies along with itself.

In spite of this prospect, there has been
almost no progress toward defusing the ex-
plosive animosity. Israeli policy seems di-
rected above all else at forcing the Arabs
formally to admit defeat and, by implication,
to accept as settled many Issues still out-
standing. But viewed in long-range terms,
this reverses the logical order of events. First,
the issues that divide the antagonists should
be resolved; then a formal end to hostilities
could follow almost as a matter , of course.
>Arab leaders now find it impossible to ac-
knowledge Israel under duress. And even if
they can be forced to do so, their signatures
on a peace treaty will neveT prevent further
warfare while the basic causes of Arab hos-
tility remain. After almost two decades of
no progress toward reconciliation, Israelis
and their American well-wishers should ex-

amine soberly the possibility that a change
of strategy could bring better results,

A POSSIBLE NEW APPROACH

It is obviously far easier to criticize past
policies than to formulate new ones. There
are no dramatic new initiatives to propose,
and no one can say with assurance that this
or that program will work. But what might
offer some hope is a new approach, one that
focuses not on securing controversial and
possibly unessential Israeli “rights” but on
helping the Arabs regain their self-respect.
Over the long run, this can be done only by
the Arab countries themselves, by means of
development that enables them to view
themselves as the economic and political
equals of Israel. For the shorter term, how-
ever, there are at least two offenses to Arab
pride that could be eliminated : the unhealed
sore of the refugees from the 1948 violence
and the presence on Arab soil of conquering
Israeli soldiers. By persuading the Israelis to
take a generous attitude on these two issues,
moreover, the U.S. could demonstrate its
impartiality in a way that would strengthen
the hand of its own embarrassed Arab
friends — e.g., Hussein of Jordan, Faisal of
Saudi Arabia, ef al.

The form and dimensions of the refugee
problem may have been altered substantially
by the outcome of the fighting. The Israeli
forces overran, and now occupy, territory
where about half of the refugees lived before
the war started. It is Impossible to predict
how many will end up In Israeli-occupied
territory. An undetermined number fled to
areas still in Arab hands and, although Israel
has agreed to permit some of them to return,
it is still unclear how liberal the Israeli Gov-
ernment will be about their repatriation. But
it is certain that Israel has under its Juris-
diction a large share of the refugees.

There has been speculation that Israel
will now move to Integrate them into the
economic life of the captured lands. In this
there may be some wishful thinking. For
the west-bank region of Jordan, although
already developed to a considerable degree,
was crowded before Its occupation. It may be
impossible to absorb all of the refugees there,
and thus far Tel Aviv has shown no willing-
ness to take them back into pre-war Israel.
Signs of Arab resistance to Israeli rule in
Old Jerusalem, moreover, cast doubt on
the assumption that many Arabs will live
willingly under the government of Israel. It
is conceivable that events may prove to have
diminished the refugee problem. On the
other hand, it may turn out that the situa-
tion has only been complicated further.
Certainly the way in which the Israeli-con-
trolled refugees are treated could play a
part in determining the future attitude of
reasonable Arabs. And the U.S., by insist-
ing on fair and considerate treatment, could
help regain its position among these Arabs.

THE "OLD” REFUGEE PROBLEM

But there still remains the “old” refugee
issue, which has been nagging the conscience
of the world since 700,000 refugees fled Pal-
estine when Israel was established. In nine-
teen years their numbers have swollen to’
1,300,000 and they lived, before the latest
fighting broke out, in Lebanon, Syria, Jor-
don, and the Gaza Strip. Some exist in the
worst squalor; the luckiest occupy monoto-
nous, crowded, but relatively livable camps
operated by the United Nations Belief and
Works Agency. Even they are housed, clothed,
fed, and inadequately educated on a daily
allowance of 10 cents per person.

The U.S. .contributes, the lion’s share to-
ward their subsistence; It has given $403
million of the $599 million donated to refu-
gee care through last year. Private citizens
recently formed a Near East Emergency Do-
nations Committee (NEED) to channel ad-
ditional corporate and individual donations
to the agency in the current emergency.
Periodically, UB. officials have attempted to

promote a settlement. Invariably, rebuffs
from one side or the other have made us
throw up our hands. Israel has attempted to
use the refugees as bargaining counters in
its campaign to force Arab recognition. The
Arabs have seen them as their strongest claim
on the decency of the West — their only good
card in the propaganda game.

Israel has much to gain from elimination
of the problem. Besides being pitiable, the
refugees are extremely dangerous. From their
ranks have come most of the commando-
type raiders who periodically cross Into
Israel and stage terrorist attacks. It is their
presence, as an organized, easily manipu-
lated pressure group, that has kept Arabs of
good will at the mercy of lowest-common-
denominator politics. If, as Arab extremists
suggest, Israel is to be turned into "another '
Vietnam,” it wdll be refugees who provide the
guerrillas.

Working out a detailed plan will be diffi-
cult, the more so as such a plan may well
face Arab attempts to sabotage it by pressure
on the refugees. But it surely Is not beyond
human capability. Its provisions wdll presum-
ably have to include acceptance by Israel of
a sizeable portion of the refugees as repatri-
ates (although this requirement could per-
haps be satisfied by continued occupancy, of
Israeli territory by the refugees now there) ,
generous compensation for the others, invi-
tations to many to resettle in the U.S. and
other countries, and intensive training de-
signed to make them attractive as human
resources throughout the Arab world. If the
plan is generous enough, and reasonable
enough, it will be extremely difficult for the
most Intransigent Arab leader to refuse it,
standing up indefinitely to the combined
pressure of world opinion, his Own citizens,
and the refugees themselves.

In the excitement of Israel’s overwhelming
military success, it may be easier to per-
suade the Israelis to tackle the refugee prob-
lem than to give up the leverage of their ter-
ritorial gains. But it might be well for the
U.S. to encourage them to consider with-
drawal — and without some of the prior con-
ditions on which they now insist. It is by
no means obvious that the terms sought by
Israel will really contribute to the future
peace of the area and hence to its own ulti-
mate interests. Such a withdrawal might
seem a return to the conditions that brought
on the fighting, and a pointless abandon-
ment of hard-won fortified defense positions.
But it could be argued that the Arab fortifi-
cations on the Syrian heights and the
massed troops in the Sinai Desert were symp-
toms, not causes, of the hostility. Arab re-
sentment of Israel’s presence — the basic
cause of the fighting — has been intensified
by Israeli occupation of Arab territory. Some
diplomats believe that from its present posi-
tion of strength, Israel could well afford to
hand back some of the land, undercutting
Arab charges that it is aggressive and
expansionist.

U.S. officials argue that it is too early to
expect the Israelis to mitigate their con-
ditions. Internal political considerations
make it difficult for Prime Minister Eshkol to
do so at the moment. In 1956, American dip-
lomats point out, even under the combined
pressure of the U.S. and the Russians, Israeli
troops remained four months in the Gaza
Strip and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba
before withdrawing. Publicly, however, we
have given no indication that we wish to see
the Israelis writhdraw — except on their own
original terms, which American officials con-
cede would be dangerous for any Arab leader
to accept. And if we have been active behind
the scenes, no effects are visible.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

If by whatever means, the Immediate crisis
can be damped down and the attention of
the Arabs directed away from revenge, the
prospects for eventual development of the
region are good. The impact of the war has,

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at least temporarily, revived the goal of uni-
fied effort and shown Arab leaders how badly
they need to strengthen themselves. If ever
a section of the globe cried out for regional
development, It is the Middle East. Of the oil-
rich countries, only Iraq has the resources
to become a balanced agricultural-industrial
state. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and
Libya combined have about ten million resi-
dents, and almost all their land is desert. Yet
their oil resources generate tremendous
amounts of capital, most of which cannot
be constructively employed within their own
borders. So great are the returns from oil
that the Middle East, given technics*! assist-
ance and encouragement, could probably
finance its own development with almost no
foreign financial aid.

Kuwait has^for six years shared some of
its great oil wealth by way of loans and bank
deposits totaling nearly $700 million. Some
expanded version of the Kuwait Fund for
Arab Economic Development, with other oil-
producing countries Joining in support, is
probably the most promising vehicle for de-
velopment. Dr. Talha Yafli, economist and
general manager of Kuwait Investment Co.,
has worked out in some detail how such an
inter-Arab fund could be financed and the
large sums of money that it could provide for
development. Under his proposal, all oil-pro-
ducing countries would be obliged to con-
tribute 5 percent of their oil revenues, to
be matched by an equal contribution by the
private foreign companies holding the oil
concessions. If the organization were started
this year on that principle, he says, it would
Immediately have $308 million at its disposal.
By 1990, he estimates, it would have taken
in $14 billion. Such amounts dwarf the $3.8
billion in American economic and military
aid to the Arab countries over the last
decade.

Consideration is also once more being given
to the establishment of a Middle Eastern
Development Sank. From the standpoint of
the U.S. this would offer an opportunity to
play a direct role in development of the re-
gion. Involvement in such a scheme at this
time might be dlfficuljt to sell Congress, be-
cause It could commit the U.S. to large-scale
support of programs devised In considerable
degree by others. But it would help convince
the Arabs that we are not determined to
force an American solution to Middle Eastern
economic problems.

IRRIGATION AND ELECTRICITY

Spending all the funds wisely, of course,
would be anything but automatic. Planners
and developers can be hired, however, and
patterns have already been set elsewhere. A
notable example Is the integrated regional-
development program being carried out in

By any standard, the U.S. has a huge stake
In the tranquility of the Middle East. As a
high-ranking State Department official puts
It: “We can’t have another one of these
wars every few years. It’s too costly and It's
too damned dangerous.” Among other things,
this is probably the last war the Arabs and
Israel can fight without employing fearfully
destructive and sophisticated weapons. The
escalation from 1956 is Itself sobering.

The obstacles that confront the U.S. In
its efforts to play a constructive role are
admittedly greater than at any time since
it moved onto the Middle Eastern stage, and
it will take time to restore our exhausted
credit with the Arabs. But the effort must
be made. Our own safety is too intimately
involved to write off the Arabs. And If we are
not to write them off, our policy makers may
well have to move visibly into a posture of
more balanced friendship with both sides.
The war, and our pro-Israeli stance, have
cut the ground from beneath those Arabs
who were our advocates. If they are to take
a public position favorable to us again,
we must give them something to rally
around. It Is equally true that the Arabs will
have to respond positively. Our commit-
ment to Israel’s existence is not negotiable.

From our own point of view, the beginning
of wisdom is to undersand that we are in
serious trouble In the Arab lands, and that
we cannot Just wait patiently for them to
get over their anger. If we make no moves,
our adversaries could win the game by
default.

ORDER OP BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Montoya in the chair) . The clerk will
call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.

Is there further morning business?

FEDERAL SPENDING AND EXECU-
TIVE REORGANIZATION

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, growing
public pressure for new Government
services coupled with the inevitable
bureaucratic tendency to expand has

needed information by establishing a
Hoover-type Commission on the Opera-
tion of the Executive Branch. This blue-
ribbon panel would be authorized to sur-
vey the organization and programs of
the Federal bureaucracy for a 2-year
period and to report its findings and rec-
ommendations to the President and the
Congress. Forty-one of my colleagues
have since joined in cosponsorship of
this measure.

More recently a similar proposal (S.
2116) was put forth by the distinguished
junior Senator from Connecticut [Mr.
Ribicoff] and cosponsored by 20 fellow
Senators. Thus 63 Senators have ex-
pressed a desire for such a study.

This evidence of concern is most heart-
ening. For if domestic Federal spending
is truly to be limited a thorough review
of executive organization and adminis-
trative procedures is an absolute neces-
sity. And only a professionally staffed
review commission with unstinting offi-
cial support can perform the complex
examination required. Such a compre-
hensive and integrated study cannot be
undertaken directly by the Congress. Its
workload is too heavy and its responsi-
bilities too divided. Neither is it likely to
be undertaken by the bureaucracy itself,
which has a vested interest in maintain-
ing the status quo. A special commission
would best be equipped to provide the
expertise and devote the continuing at-
tention necessary to get good results.

Mr. President, spending cuts to be ef-
fective must be made selectively. And to
be made selectively, a great deal of
knowledge is required. While such de-
tailed knowledge is not as yet available,
enough illustrations have come to light
to give ample cause for concern. For ex-
ample, in recent years the field of man-
power development has become a fertile
one for Federal bureaucrats. Certainly
some federally sponsored programs are
needed if the vicious cycle of unemploy-
ment and poverty Is to be broken. Yet
these projects have grown with such
abandon that today 15 different Federal
departments and agencies find them-
selves administering 79 different training
and education programs. In addition,
nine different programs deal with job re-
cruitment and at least five subsidize on-

Iran’s Khuzestan province by the Develop-
ment & Resources Corp, of New York. Formed
in 1955 by David Lllienthal and Gordon
Clapp, two former Tennessee Valley Author-
ity chairmen, the company has reclaimed
50,000 acres from the desert and plans even-
tually to turn an additional 200,000 acres
Into productive agricultural land. Farm out-
put In the province has already Increased
two and a half times as a result of the large-
scale Irrigation and hydroelectric-dam sys-
tems. Development & Resources is carrying
out fourteen other projects around the world,
and Its officials are more than willing to take
on part of an Arab development program.

A dramatic possibility for development is
the plan devised by Rear Admiral Lewis
Strauss, former chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, and strongly supported
by former President Elsenhower. It calls for
the construction of three huge nuclear-pow-
ered plants to produce electricity and to con-
vert seawater Into fresh water. The water
would then be used to Irrigate thousands of
Acres of land that is now desert. Strauss es-
timates the cost of the project at around $1
billion and has proposed that the U.S. put
up half of the Initial $200-million capitali-
sation.

pushed Federal spending to enormous
proportions in recent years. Despite an
obvious need for a large part of this
budgetary increase commonsense tells us
that much of it is wasted. The adminis-
tration, the Congress, and the American
people generally agree that the economic
pressures of the Vietnam war require
that unessential domestic spending be
curbed and that wasteful programs be
eliminated.

If significant improvements are to be
made, however, this unanimity or pur-
pose must become swiftly translated into
action. But unfortunately it seems as
though Federal spending is becoming
merely a convenient topic of conversa-
tion like the weather, with everyone
talking about it, but no one controlling it.

Part of the problem here is that de-
tailed information about the strengths
and weaknesses of Federal programs that
is so necessary for making intelligent
budget savings is simply not available.

On January 11 of this year I intro-
duced a bill (S. 47) to develop this much

the- job training projects.

Mr. President, illustrations such as
these, thought provoking as they may be,
yield no ready answers. They merely
underscore the need for better coordina-
tion and less duplication by the Federal
bureaucracy. If these situations are to
be effectively prevented in the future, a
thorough examination of the executive
branch is required now. For it is only
through such a comprehensive study that
genuine long-term improvements can be
made. It is far better to forestall unpro-
ductive programs than to prune them
after they have become entrenched. In
fact, if such a review had been inaugu-
rated when this bill was first introduced
in 1965, perhaps we would not be con-
templating a 10-percent tax surcharge
and emergency cuts in Federal spending
today.

A poet once said, “The chaos is come
of the organized disorder.” A brief look at
the multitude of overlapping and ineffi-
cient Federal programs that have sprung
forth in the 12 years since the last

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